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Introduction 
Peanut butter and jelly. Abbott and Costello. Hall and Oates. Cooter and Ulen. 
History is replete with great partnerships in which the whole seems to exceed the sum of 
the parts. What is it that makes a great partnership in legal scholarship? This paper sets 
out to understand the determinants of coauthorship in law. 
Legal scholarship, of course, is a subset of scholarship in general, and so we need to 
situate the analysis in a broader perspective. Historically, most scientific writing in all 
fields was sole-authored until the mid-twentieth century.1 Since then, many fields have 
witnessed an increase in the frequency of coauthorship. As coauthorship has burgeoned, 
so too has a literature on the causes, consequences, and ethics of coauthorship.2 Much of 
this literature focuses on the discipline of economics, but attention has recently turned to 
the incidence of coauthorship in law.3 Casual empiricism, and earlier studies, suggest an 
apparent trend toward coauthorship in law, notwithstanding early advice to younger 
scholars not to coauthor.4 The causes and implications of the trend are not fully 
understood. In particular, the role of interdisciplinary scholarship, such as law and 
economics, and empirical work in driving the trend toward coauthorship has not been 
analyzed. 
In this paper we set out to understand the determinants of coauthorship in legal 
scholarship, and we give particular attention to the influence of interdisciplinary legal 
                                                 
† Prepared for the panel on the “Future of Empirical Legal Studies,” at the conference honoring Professor 
Thomas S. Ulen, the University of Illinois College of Law, November 2010. The authors thank Adam Cox, 
William Landes, Eric Posner, Lior Strahilevitz, and Mitu Gulati for helpful conversations; Sarah Arendt, 
Greg Cheyne, Riley Lochridge, Michael Kuppersmith, and Kyle Poelker for research assistance; Dean Ann 
Perry for moral support and personnel management; and Northwestern University Law Library for granting 
access to its physical volumes. 
1 M. Greene, The Demise of the Lone Author, 450 NATURE 1165 (2007); L. D. Claxton, Scientific 
Authorship: Part 2. History, Recurring Issues, Practices, and Guidelines, 589 MUTATION 
RESEARCH/REVIEWS IN MUTATION RESEARCH 31 (2005). 
2 See, e.g., Jason W. Osborne and Abigail Holland, What Is Authorship, And What Should It Be? A 
Survey Of Prominent Guidelines For Determining Authorship In Scientific Publications, 14 Practical 
Assessment, Research and Evaluation 1 (2008), available at http://pareonline.net/pdf/v14n15.pdf 
3 Tracey E. George and Chris Guthrie, Joining Forces: The Role of Collaboration in the Development of 
Legal Thought, 52 J. Legal. Educ. 559 (2002); Paul H. Edelman & Tracey E. George, Six Degrees of Cass 
Sunstein: Collaboration Networks in Legal Scholarship, 11 Green Bag 2d 19 (2007); see also Paul H. 
Edelman & Tracey E. George, Sunstein 1s and 2s, in THE GREEN BAG ALMANAC AND READER 473 
( Ross Davies ed., 2008). 
4 Robert Abrams, Sing Muse: Legal Scholarship for New Law Teachers, 37 J. Legal Education 1, 6 
(1987) (young legal scholars should never coauthor because of concerns about shared credit and increased 
time required.) 
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scholarship, including empirical legal studies. In part I, we review the existing theories of 
academic collaboration, and we draw out the empirical implications for legal academics. 
A key prediction of this literature is that intellectual collaboration rises with scholarly 
specialization. As knowledge grows, a subject may become increasingly complex, and 
greater and more specific intellectual inputs may be necessary to make a contribution. 
The likelihood that a single person possesses all of the human capital necessary to 
produce a contribution falls, and collaboration rises. In effect, collaboration represents a 
greater division of labor as the size of the scholarly “market” grows.  
In legal scholarship, interdisciplinary work tends to be more specialized than general 
legal scholarship because it draws on a different academic literature and it often applies 
unfamiliar methodologies. Among interdisciplinary approaches in law, empiricism 
appears particularly specialized relative to more conventional legal scholarship. 
Quantitative analysis is a methodology that historically has not been part of legal 
curriculum, and even now, it is rare for a legal academic to have graduate training in 
these methods. A plausible prediction is that by virtue of its higher degree of 
specialization, interdisciplinary, and particularly empirical, work will more often be 
collaborative than general legal scholarship.  
In Part II, we test this prediction by examining patterns of coauthorship in two sets of 
legal academic publications. First, we examine all articles published in the “top fifteen” 
law reviews between 2000 and 2010. We find wide variation across these reviews in the 
incidence of coauthored and interdisciplinary articles. We confirm the patterns that other 
investigators have detected in subsamples of these reviews: the presence of upward trends 
in coauthorship and empiricism in law reviews.5 Parallel upward trends, however, do not 
tell us if the two phenomena are related. To test the specialization hypothesis, we 
examine whether the growth in both coauthorship and empiricism are connected, and we 
find that they are. The increase in empirical articles accounts for a substantial share of the 
growth in coauthored articles.  
In Part III, we examine two prominent, faculty-edited journals specializing in law & 
economics: the Journal of Legal Studies and the Journal of Law, Economics & 
Organization. We focus on these journals because they offer a long time series, and they 
are “bellwethers” of mainstream law & economics scholarship. Coauthored articles are 
far more common in these journals than in the general-interest, student-edited law 
reviews, a fact which itself is consistent with the specialization hypothesis. Strikingly, the 
data show that the share of non-technical articles in these journals has plummeted since 
1989. With the expansion of empiricism and formal modeling in these journals, 
                                                 
5 Shari Seidman Diamond and Pam Mueller, Empirical Legal Scholarship in Law Reviews, 6 Ann. Rev. 
Soc. Sci. 581 (2010) (empiricism); Michael Heise, An Empirical Analysis of Empirical Legal Scholarship 
Production, 1990-2009, __ Ill. L. Rev. __ (2011) (this volume) (empiricism); Theodore Eisenberg, The 
Origins, Nature, and Promise of Empirical Legal Studies and a Response to Concerns, __ Ill. L. Rev. __ 
(2011) (this volume) (empiricism); Edelman and George, infra n.3 (coauthorship); Guthrie and George, 
infra n.3 (coauthorship).] 
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coauthorship has risen substantially. These results strongly support the view that 
specialization, and specifically the demand for empirical legal scholarship, has 
contributed to the coauthorship trend in law. 
A second prediction of the literature on intellectual collaboration is that as the 
opportunity cost of a scholar’s time rises, the implicit price of collaborating with her 
increases. For example, a colleague who previously may have been satisfied with an 
acknowledgment in the “dagger footnote” for her comments on a draft may instead 
demand coauthorship credit. We call this the compensation theory of coauthorship. The 
advent of empirical legal studies increased the value of empirical skills in legal academia 
and thereby improved the bargaining position of empiricists. Although we do not test the 
prediction that acknowledgement credits will be elevated into coauthorship, we test an 
alternative hypothesis about the compensation of collaborators. When the value of a 
coauthor’s contribution increases, she might demand deviation from the norm of 
alphabetical ordering of authors. A more prominent placement of a scholar’s name would 
signal the importance of her scholarly input. We examine deviations from the 
alphabetical ordering of names in coauthored papers. Among both the law review and the 
faculty-edited journals, we find some evidence that these deviations are more common 
for empirical papers than for other papers. This pattern does not appear to reflect a 
different disciplinary norm because economics tends to follow the alphabetic norm, and 
there is no evidence of deviation from the norm for articles involving formal 
mathematical models. 
The results suggest that legal scholarship in the past decade has undergone an 
unprecedented transformation marked by the rapid growth of interdisciplinary, especially 
empirical, work. This article builds on the work of prior investigators in documenting this 
pattern. But, what has heretofore gone relatively unnoticed is that this shift in legal output 
is also accompanied by a change in the means of scholarly production. A legal empiricist, 
in contrast to the more traditional faculty member who labors in isolation, is likely to 
produce scholarship through a partnership. In Part V, the paper concludes with 
conjectures on some broader consequences of this shift for legal academia.  
 
I. Why Coauthor? 
A. Leading Theories and Additional Considerations 
The question of what drives scholarly collaboration is not new. The literature has 
identified four leading factors that influence the decision to coauthor. The first is the 
increased complexity of scientific fields, with associated demands for specialization. This 
is partly driven by scientific progress, but also a result of the labor conditions for 
researchers. As higher education enrollments and budgets have expanded, there are more 
professors. The need for research faculty to carve out a distinctive niche for their 
scholarly careers leads to more specialization, requiring collaboration to produce research 
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of publishable quality.6 The distinctive skills of a collaborator may permit an academic to 
produce work that she would not able to produce on her own. Two authors with different 
specialties are likely to play a complementary role in a team production function. From 
this perspective, which we call the complementarity theory of coauthorship, predicts a 
continuous, and possibly accelerating, trend toward collaboration.  
A second theory treats coauthorship as a means of compensating colleagues for 
input. The opportunity cost of a scholar’s time has increased, raising the market price of 
presubmission comments on manuscripts by colleagues. An oft-cited possibility is that 
colleagues who would formerly be willing to provide uncompensated comments on 
manuscripts must now must be offered coauthorship credit in return for their constructive 
comments.7 An analogous prediction is that a colleague’s input may be so valuable that 
she may garner a lead authorship as a public acknowledgement of the importance of her 
contribution. We call this theory, developed in the context of economics, the 
compensation account of scholarly collaboration. It emphasizes the collective nature of 
scholarly production, but does not imply any increase in quality relative to the former 
equilibrium of sole-authorship with uncompensated input from colleagues.8 Rather, it is a 
prediction of how the rewards to intellectual teamwork will be distributed. When a 
certain input becomes more valuable, it will command a higher (implicit) price.  
A third possibility is that quality may be enhanced through coauthored work. 
Collaboration may improve quality when there are increasing returns to specialization, as 
conjectured above under complementarity theory. In addition to joint contributions to 
production brought by people with different scholarly profiles, coauthors might increase 
the assessment of reliability of the paper. If the conditions for the Condorcet jury theorem 
apply, more coauthors would indicate that more people thought the paper was worth 
claiming [partial] credit for. It also means, presumably, that multiple authors have 
carefully evaluated the data and argument. For a journal editor, this is a signal of quality: 
not one but two or more authors are willing to stake their reputation on the accuracy and 
quality of the paper. This should lead to higher quality research, ceteris paribus. Indeed, 
there is some evidence from economics that coauthorship leads to higher output of better 
quality.9 
                                                 
6 Andy H. Barnett, Richard W. Ault, David L. Kaserman, The Rising Incidence of Coauthorship in 
Economics: Further Evidence, 70 REV. ECON. STAT. 539 – 543 (1988); John M. McDowell and Michael 
Melvin, The Determinants of CoAuthorship: An Analysis of the Economics Literature, 65 REV. ECON. 
STAT. 155 – 160 (1983). 
7 Barnett, Ault and Kaserman, supra n. 6; see also See also David Laband and Robert Tollison, 
Intellectual Collaboration, 108 J. Pol. Econ. 632 (2000) (emphasizing multiple forms of collaboration 
besides coauthorship). 
8 Compensation theory can be seen as consistent with the collaboration theory, as it simply describes the 
division of credit between two producers of a collaborative product. Collaborative work of constant quality 
now merits coauthorship as a price for inducing the second producer to contribute, whereas it would not 
have in an earlier era. 
9See Durden and Perri, supra n. 11 (coauthorship enhances productivity in total and per-capita article 
production); see also Raymond D. Sauer, Estimates of the Returns to Quality and Coauthorship in 
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A fourth prominent explanation for collaboration relates to the uncertainty of the 
editorial review process. Having two authors to review a manuscript and provide input 
might make for a better article, but will also facilitate market saturation if two people are 
working in closely aligned fields.10 Diversification reduces the risk of rejection from 
journals, and is particularly attractive given shorter tenure clocks and longer review 
periods by journals. It also may increase the chances of a “home-run” paper, if we think 
that academic influence is distributed with a long right tail. In other words, if a few 
papers have a large impact, authoring more papers increases the probability that one will 
produce such a paper. This diversification theory emphasizes strategic factors in the 
decision to coauthor, and so implies no increase in quality relative to sole-authored work. 
None of these theories from the literature has been definitively accepted, and 
empirical tests of them are rare.11 These theories address the benefits of collaboration or 
the distribution of the benefits between coauthors. The costs of collaboration have 
received less attention, but they warrant mentioning.  Perhaps the first of these is the cost 
of finding a scholarly match. The increase in the size of the academic profession in recent 
years means that there is a larger pool from which to find suitable coauthors,12 and the 
impact of this growth on the cost of collaborating is ambiguous. A larger pool may 
reduce the cost of collaborating because it raises the likelihood that an academic with a 
particular specialty exists. At the same time, the larger pool from which to choose a 
collaborator may raise the search cost of finding the well-suited academic partner.  
Perhaps the most obvious cost of coauthorship is the time and energy expended 
managing the partnership, which we call coordination costs. These costs include direct 
expenditures such as telephone calls and traveling for meetings. They also include 
intellectual efforts such as reviewing and editing one another’s work and integrating 
disparate parts of a paper.13 Technological advances have surely lowered these costs. 
Word processing features such as “track changes” ease the process of writing. A 
consequence of email and the internet is that the geographic proximity of a collaborator is 
much less relevant than in the past.  
Less directly observable are the costs of reaching an agreement on the substance 
of the article or the structure of its argument. Part of this cost is incurred up front in the 
decision to form a scholarly partnership. The collaborators must have an initial agreement 
on the aims and scope of the research project and a plan for the division of labor. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Economic Academia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 855 (1988) (Collaboration through formal coauthorship increases 
the quantity or quality or both of one's professional productivity, which has market value); Matthias Sutter 
and Martin Kocher, Patterns of coauthorship among economics departments in the USA, 36 APPLIED 
ECON. 327 (2004) (Quality of coauthors’ institutions, measured by rankings of institutions, has a significant 
impact on the number of coauthored papers in top economics journals). 
10 Barnett, Ault and Kaserman, supra n. 6. 
11 See Garey C. Durden and Timothy J. Perri, Coauthorship and Publication Efficiency, 23 Am. Econ. J. 
69 (1995). 
12 J. Hudson, Trends in multi-authored papers in economics, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 153 – 158 (1996). 
13 Abrams, supra n. 4 (“Integrating two peoples’ work into a single cohesive product consumes additional 
hours.”) 
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Negotiation over objectives and duties may be costly. As the collaboration progresses, 
unexpected obstacles may be encountered, and unanticipated results emerge. Differences 
of opinion as to the direction of the research effort may develop, and it may be necessary 
for coauthors to engage in explicit renegotiation over which research claims will be 
advanced and how responsibilities will be divided. In the extreme, when collaborators 
cannot reach agreement, it may imply the dissolution of the research partnership. It is not 
obvious whether technological changes raise or lower the likelihood of disagreements 
between a given set of authors. But it is possible that technology may facilitate the sorting 
of potential collaborators such that the members of resulting partnerships are better 
matched.  
An additional cost of collaboration is the familiar agency problem. A 
collaboration is a partnership, and when a partner’s contribution requires costly effort, 
she may contribute less than promised or expected.  To curtail her free-riding off the 
efforts of others, members of the collaboration must monitor each others’ contributions. 
Yet, monitoring itself is costly, and in some instances, it may not be possible because of 
unobservability or unverifiability.  Collaborators may be geographically distant , and 
even when physically proximate, it is unlikely they directly observe how much effort 
each is contributing. Even if labor hours were known, it may be hard for a collaborator to 
assess the effort entailed in a partner’s contribution. Imagine a collaboration between a 
physicist and a poet. The physicist likely cannot judge whether the few lines of haiku 
contributed were tossed off quickly or the product of deep reflection and arduous 
burnishing. As interdisciplinary collaborations often join together scholars with divergent 
skill sets, the trend toward interdisciplinary scholarship in law may expand the incidence 
of agency problems in coauthorships in legal academia. 
Another cost of collaboration is the diminution of credit. Inputs of author effort 
are not directly observed, and consequently, outsiders cannot easily tell which author 
contributed the most to an article or book.  A common rule of thumb is to divide credit 
equally among coauthors. Thus, each author of a paper of quality Q will be assigned Q/n 
of credit, where n is the number of coauthors. 14 Although we do not observe directly the 
rewards to scholarship or the efforts of authors, this rule of thumb has immediate 
implications for the relationship between inputs and payoffs of collaboration. For 
example, in order to make it worthwhile for an author to invest the same amount of effort 
in an article with n-1 coauthors as she would in a single-authored article, the total payoffs 
to the coauthored article must equal or exceed, by a factor of n, the average payoff of the 
sole-authored paper. Alternatively, if the payoff to an author of joining a collaboration 
with n-1 coauthors is less than 1/nth of a solo-authored article, the author’s contribution 
(in terms of effort or time) must be less than 1/nth that of a solo-authored article. As 
                                                 
14 James Lindgren and Daniel Seltzer, The Most Prolific Professors and Faculties, 71 CHI-KENT L. REV 
791 (1996); Bernard Black and Paul Caron, Ranking Law Schools: Using SSRN to Measure Scholarly 
Performance, 81 INDIANA L. J. 83 (2006) (both counting giving fractional credit to each coauthor.) 
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effort and payoffs are not directly observable, we cannot tell which of these possibilities 
(coauthoring earns higher rewards) or (coauthoring requires less effort) occurs most 
often. 
A caveat is that an unequal division of credit among coauthors may be unavoidable. 
A strong norm is to refer to collaborations of two authors by listing their names (e.g., 
Cooter and Ulen). But when the number of collaborators is greater than two, the tendency 
is to refer to the collaborators by the name of the first author with all other coauthors 
tucked into the catchall phrase “et al.” (e.g., Black, et al.)15 In this appellation, only the 
lead author’s name is mentioned, and he may receive a disproportionate amount of the 
publicity and reputational benefit of the collaboration. A very small number of 
collaborations have successfully acquired designations that reflect a relatively equal 
crediting of authors, such as abbreviations (e.g., LLSV) or Esperanto-like acronyms (e.g., 
“McNollgast”).16 But these instances are rare. The relative penalty of having one’s name 
disappear into an “et al.” tag offers another reason why coauthorships in law are almost 
entirely pairings rather than larger combinations.17  
Coordination costs and credit diminution create a potential adverse selection problem. 
It is unlikely that any partnership enjoys a perfectly equitable division of labor (and the 
coordination costs of ensuring that it does would be very high). A consequence is that 
Q/n of credit overcompensates some members of a collaboration for their contributions. 
Ceteris paribus, this may imply an adverse selection problem in scholarly collaboration. 
The pool of potential coauthors may contain a higher number of slackers than the overall 
academic population. This could lead to less overall effort being put into coauthored 
papers. One solution is to coauthor repeatedly with the same partners, which makes it 
likely that any inequalities on particular projects will even out over time. Repeated 
interactions may enhance the ability of coauthors to monitor each other’s effort. This 
solution also means that the partners can develop a joint reputation, raising the external 
assessment of Q relative to their sole-authored work. This would help overcome any 
moral hazard problems that arise after a partnership has begun.18 A reason to doubt the 
                                                 
15 Bernard Black, Charles Silver, David Hyman & William Sage, Stability, Not Crisis: Medical 
Malpractice Claim Outcomes In Texas, 1988-2002, 2 J. EMP. L. STUD. 207 (2005). But see, e.g., Kathryn 
Zeiler, Charles Silver, Bernard Black, David Hyman & William Sage, Physicians' Insurance Limits and 
Malpractice Payments: Evidence from Texas Closed Claims, 1990-2003, 36 J. L. STUD. S9 (2007). 
16 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the 
World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 106 Law and 
Finance, J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast, 
Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987); Mathew 
D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast, The Political Origins of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 15 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 180 (1999). 
17 This suggests that bluebook citing conventions might impact coauthorship practices. We do not test 
this proposition in this article. Further work might examine the covariance of disciplinary citation practices 
with coauthorship rates. 
18 We expect that the pattern of coauthor relationships over time bears further examination from this 
perspective. A long term coauthoring relationship probably implies declining marginal coordination costs 
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severity of any adverse selection problem is that for every slacking academic who seeks a 
coauthorship, there must be a partner willing to furnish inputs for less than a 
proportionate share of the rewards. An academic anticipating that she would be 
shortchanged in this manner would decline to collaborate. A key prediction of the 
canonical adverse selection model is that this fear of disadvantageous trades would create 
a vicious cycle resulting the unraveling of the “lemons market.” 19 As we observe the 
incidence of collaboration rising rather than declining, we doubt any adverse selection 
problems are severe. Moreover, many coauthored works are undoubtedly of very high 
quality, including some of the most respected and influential contributions in law and in 
law & economics.20 
This discussion has alluded to the fact that most collaborations comprise two scholars 
but others involve more. We do not offer a sharp prediction on the optimal number of 
coauthors. But many of the considerations mentioned above would are directly relevant. 
For example, coordination costs may increase dramatically, possibly even exponentially, 
as the number of coauthors rises above two. In a group of three, each coauthor must 
monitor two others; and if a potential slacker is identified, the two reliable coauthors 
must decide who will enforce the coauthorship norms. This may explain why the modal 
number of authors on a coauthored paper is two; but disciplinary norms in this regard 
vary. In psychology, for example, more coauthors is the norm.21  
We readily acknowledge that we do not have a generally accepted theory about what 
academics seek to maximize.22 The complementarity theory described above implicitly 
assumes that scholars maximize quality of output. If producing better work requires 
coauthorship, then academics will coauthor.  Diversification theory, on the other hand, 
assumes that academics maximize reputational payoff, which might be only loosely 
correlated with actual quality. Reputation might be enhanced by the sheer number of 
publication produced. In this case, coauthoring might expand the number of lines on the 
resume that a scholar can obtain, and at the same time, it may make it difficult for 
external assesors of outputs, such as academic deans and departments, to evaluate the 
                                                                                                                                                 
over time; on the other hand, there may be also be declining marginal returns to the relationship as 
complementarities get exploited. 
19 George Akerlof, “The Market for Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. 
ECON. 488 (1970). 
20 Prominent partnerships in law and economics we might mention include William Landes and Richard 
Posner, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, Robert Cooter and Tom Ulen, and Louis Kaplow and Steven 
Shavell. 
21 See e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Lawrence Sherman, Heather Strang, Geoffrey C. Barnes, and Daniel Woods, 
Reintegrative shaming, procedural justice, and recidivism: The engagement of offenders’ psychological 
mechanisms in the Canberra RISE drinking-and-driving experiment, 41 L. SOC. REV. 553 (2007); Law and 
Society Review, 41(3), 553-586; H.J. Smith, T.R Tyler., Y.J. Huo, D. J. Ortiz, and E.A. Lind, The self-
relevant implications of the group-value model: Group membership, self-worth, and procedural justice, 34 
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 470 (1998). See generally George and Guthrie, supra n. 3, at 567 (“Roughly 
a quarter of social science collaborations involved three or more authors.”). 
22 Compare Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everyone Else 
Does), 3 SUPREME COURT ECONOMIC REVIEW, Volume 1 (1993). 
9 
individual contribution. Suppose, alternatively, that academics seem to maximize leisure, 
which would require them to claim credit for as much work as they can produce for as 
little effort as possible. As noted above, collaboration allows free-riding, and the increase 
in coauthorship may reflect greater leisure consumption. The difficult task of identifying 
the preferences of academics lies beyond the scope of this paper, but we recognize that 
our results raise these questions. 
 
B. Implications for Interdisciplinary Scholarship in Law 
What do these theories suggest about the role of interdisciplinarity and specialization 
as drivers of coauthorship in legal scholarship? Consider first complementarity theory, 
which suggests in part that the increase in specialized technical skills required in a 
particular area is likely to increase the demand for coauthorship. By bringing together 
knowledge from different fields, interdisciplinary work requires a diverse set of skills. It 
is costly for a single individual to acquire all the necessary skills, and collaboration may 
be more convenient among two or more individuals when each of them furnishes a 
different skill. Some disciplines have seen significant increases in technical specialization 
associated with the rise of modern computing and statistics program. Other disciplines 
have not. It is perhaps unsurprising that Guthrie and George show that coauthorship rates 
in elite law reviews are higher than those in humanities journals in philosophy, English 
and history, but are lower than those in psychology, economics, sociology or political 
science. The latter disciplines rely heavily on statistics; the tools of philosophy, English 
and history on the other hand, have not changed in any fundamental way. Thus 
technological change contributes to the increased gains from cooperation in certain 
disciplines and not others. 
 Law falls somewhere in the middle of this disciplinary spectrum. Historically, law 
was closer to the humanities end of the technological spectrum than the social science 
end. For example, George and Guthrie report that from 1970-1999, coauthored work 
comprised 15% of law review articles.23 This contrasts with more than 60% of social 
science articles in leading journals.24  
 But legal academia is changing. First, there has been a trend toward socio-legal 
and interdisciplinary scholarship. More and more entry-level candidates have Ph.Ds, 
typically from social sciences like economics or political science. These scholars are 
more trained in technical methods, and may bring with them norms of coauthorship from 
other disciplines. Furthermore, there are natural gains from collaboration because the new 
PhDs have skills that older legal scholars lacked, while older scholars have more 
experience and knowledge of law. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, we 
                                                 
23 George and Guthrie, supra n. 3, at 562-66. 
24 Id. Durden and Perri report an estimate that by 1985, 52% of published articles in economics were 
coauthored. Garey C. Durden and Timothy J. Perri, Coauthorship and Publication Efficiency, 23 Am. 
Econ. J. 69 (1995). 
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suspect that the increase in coauthorship in law is partly due to a wider diversity of 
academic training and consequently skill sets on law faculties. 
As interdisciplinary fields (such as law & economics) mature, a contribution that 
makes an advance over existing knowledge requires an ever greater degree of technical 
proficiency.  This intensifies the incentives for coauthorship because, when a scholar 
lacks knowledge of a relevant field, an offer of coauthorship credit may be necessary to 
induce a colleague to provide input on research project. Authors possessing especially 
valuable skills sets may even demand that their names appear first in the sequence of 
authors, deviating from the norm of alphabetic ordering.More technical sophistication 
raises the value of collaboration and hence, the “price” of careful, time-consuming 
comments to a colleague may rise to coauthorship credit. On the whole, compensation 
theory may explain any contribution of interdisciplinary and empricial work to the 
increase in coauthorship. 
The quality theory, on the other hand, does not appear to offer as strong an incentive 
for coauthorship in empirical work as does skill complementarity. If technical complexity 
alone is the driver of coauthorship, we ought to observe an increase in coauthorship in 
some areas of law and not others. After all, there is considerable variation in the degree of 
complexity across subjects in law. Tax law, for example, is often considered highly 
complex. If technical complexity alone were driving coauthorship, rates of coauthorship 
in complex legal fields such as tax should rise. In contrast, if increasing returns from 
cross-disciplinary work are driving the coauthorship phenomenon, increases in 
coauthorship should be concentrated in empirical and interdisciplinary work. 
Similarly, diversification theory does not seem to have special salience for 
interdisciplinary work. Collaboration may allow an academic to manage more effectively 
the risks of scholarship by trimming downside risks and expanding upside gains. A 
collaborator may act as a de facto reviewer or editor and thus reduce the risks of rejection 
from journals. But this rationale seemingly applies to all forms of legal scholarship and is 
not limited to or uniquely applicable to empirical or interdisciplinary work.  
Collaboration provides the opportunity to free-ride off the efforts of others. This 
opportunity may be greater in interdisciplinary work as monitoring is less effective when 
a scholar lacks proficiency in a collaborator’s field. As the respective skills of 
collaborators become more specialized, each is less equipped to assess the (labor or 
effort) cost of the other’s contribution, and the inability to monitor may provide greater 
opportunities for shirking. But we have no reason to think that the pool of scholars 
producing interdisciplinary and empirical work is more likely to be motivated by 
consumption of leisure than are other legal scholars. To the extent that authors of 
interdisciplinary and empirical work may include people who have spent years getting a 
Ph.D., sometimes in addition to a J.D. degree, one might presume the opposite: these 
coauthors have sent a costly signal of willingness to work hard and invest in novel skills.  
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 To summarize, all of the various theories of coauthorship that we outlined above 
appear relevant to coauthorships in law. Yet, complementarity theory seems to predict a 
particularly strong relationship between collaboration and the growth of empirical and 
interdisciplinary scholarship. We might also expect compensation theory to have some 
explanatory power, and a prediction is that among coauthored articles, empirical pieces 
will be more likely to deviate from the alphabetic ordering of authors. In contrast, the 
quality, diversification or leisure consumption theory may be relevant, but they do not 
offer an account as to why interdisciplinary scholarship, especially empirical work, 
would be accompanied by greater incidence of coauthorships. 
 
II. Data and Empirical Approach 
 We examine two sets of data located through the ISI-Web of Science™. First are 
all articles published in the top 15 law reviews during 2000-2010,25 and second are all 
articles published in two faculty-edited, interdisciplinary journals, the Journal of Legal 
Studies (JLS) and the Journal of Law, Economics & Organization (JLEO), during the 
period 1989-2010.26 Our predictions that interdisciplinarity, particularly empiricism, may 
influence coauthorship necessitated examination of both data sources. We chose to 
examine both student- and faculty-edited journals in order to have confidence that we 
were capturing trends in interdisciplinary scholarship rather than epiphenomena of 
particular journal markets. 
We examined the top 15 law reviews rather than limiting our attention to a few 
top reviews in order to assess coauthorship practices in a large swath of legal academia.27 
We chose JLS and JLEO because they are influential interdisciplinary journals with long 
histories. Their age provides the opportunity to look at patterns in scholarship over a 
relatively long time horizon – two decades.28  An additional consideration was the 
position these journals occupy at the intersection of law and social science, particularly 
economics. Another highly regarded interdisciplinary journal with a long history, the 
Journal of Law & Economics, tilts more clearly in the direction of economics than law, 
and for decades it has regularly published sophisticated empirical work.29 In contrast, we 
believe JLS and JLEO are bellwethers of trends in interdisciplinary legal scholarship, 
                                                 
25 Definitions of “top” are inherently arbitrary. We define the top fifteen law reviews as comprising 
Harvard Law Review, Yale Law Journal, Stanford Law Review, University of Chicago Law Review, 
Columbia Law Review, New York University Law Review, Michigan Law Review, University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, Virginia Law Review, Cornell Law Review, California Law Review, Duke 
Law Journal, Northwestern University Law Review, Texas Law Review, and the Georgetown Law Journal.  
26 For another study of empirical work in the JLS, see William Landes, The Empirical Side of Law and 
Economics, 70 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 167 (2003).  
27 Compare Ian Ayres and Frederick K. Vars, Determinants of Citations to Articles in Elite Law Reviews, 
29 J. Leg. Stud. 427 (2000) (Harvard, Yale, Stanford). 
28 For this reason, we chose not to examine ALER and JELS, which are influential but of more recent 
provenance.  
29 William M. Landes, The Empirical Side of Law & Economics, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 167, 173 (2003). 
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particularly law & economics. Our sample includes 7,540 items published in law reviews, 
including 2,785 major articles, and 1,030 articles in the two peer-reviewed journals. 
We define coauthorship in the same manner as Edelman and George. Their 
criteria is that a coauthor is any individual listed in the “by” line along with at least one 
other person. This excludes contributors identified as “with” as well as editors or those in 
a footnote. Papers can, of course, have multiple coauthors. This definition seems 
intuitive, and is consistent with the economics literature on coauthorship. From the ISI-
Web of Science™, we generated citation reports for each article in our data. A limitation 
of this source is that its coverage of citations in social science journals is more extensive 
than its coverage of citations in law reviews.30 For this reason, the results may be biased 
in the direction of favoring articles of interest to social scientists. If so, articles of greater 
interest to social scientists, such as those containing formal models and empirical 
analyses, might have higher than average citation rates. But, as we shall show in Part III, 
this is not the case, and this pattern suggests that any bias arising from the use of this 
citation data base rather than a legal data base appears modest. 
 We coded each article for its legal subject and methodology based on a brief 
inspection of the physical volume. Our subject categories were Corporate/Securities Law, 
Criminal Law, International/Comparative Law, Private/Commercial Law, and other 
Public Law. For the faculty-edited journals, we expanded this to include another 
category, which we called “Other,” to encompass articles that addressed economic 
behavior generally and not specific to any area of law. With regard to methodology, we 
were particularly interested in the presence of the two technical methods most common to 
law and economics: empirical methods and formal mathematical models. We counted an 
article as empirical if it presented a novel analysis of data. We excluded from this 
category articles that merely included tables or figures which had previously been 
published elsewhere, such as in a government report. We coded an article as containing a 
formal mathematical model if it had at least one numbered equation. To provide a 
contrast with other types of interdisciplinary scholarship, we attempted to code articles 
that were methodologically humanities-oriented, such as law & literature, philosophy, 
and legal history. These techniques are less evident upon inspection, and therefore, we 
strongly suspect that we undercounted, perhaps severely, the presence of humanities-
oriented interdisciplinary work.   
  
 
  
                                                 
30 Citations by courts are not recorded.  
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We examine these data in summary statistics, and then we turn to multiple regression 
analysis to control for the possible multiple influences on coauthorship. Specifically, we 
estimate the probability that an article is coauthored in an equation of the form:  
 
Pr(Yit) ൌ ∑ αij ୫ୣ୲୦୭ୢ୨ ൅ ∑ δik ୱ୳ୠ୨ୣୡ୲୩ ൅  ∑ γil ୲୷୮ୣ୪  ൅ ∑ ρim ୮୭ୱ୧୲୧୭୬୫ + αiTt + εit, 
 
where Yit is an indicator variable that takes the value one when article i published 
in year t is coauthored and zero otherwise. We focus on collaboration as a binary choice 
because we observe relatively little variation in the size of coauthorship teams. The 
vector Xit contains continuous characteristics of the article, including its (log) page length 
and the average number of citations per year it has received since publication. For the 
faculty-edited journals, we collected a richer set of article characteristics including the 
number of figures, whether it includes an appendix, the number of tables in an empirical 
article, and a count of the numbered equations in an article with a formal model. As we 
show below, the faculty-edited journals featured more technical articles, and we gathered 
these variables to capture more of the variation in technological sophistication of those 
articles. 31The term αiT is a coefficient on a time trend, t, and because fluctuations in the 
propensity to coauthor may not vary linearly with time, this term is replaced in some 
specifications with fixed effects for the year of publication.  The remaining explanatory 
variables are indicator variables. The αij terms are a series of binary variables for law 
review article i’s methodology: whether it is empirical, contains a formal model, or 
appears to be humanities-oriented. An article employing conventional legal analysis is the 
omitted category of methodology. The terms δik are binary variables for the subject 
matter of the article: criminal law, international/comparative Law, private/commercial 
law, other public law, and for faculty-edited journals, the category of “other.” Articles in 
corporate and securities law are the omitted category for subject. The terms γil measure 
the type of law review article: student note or comment, book review, tribute or 
memorial, and symposium article. The final set of indicator variables, ρim, measures the 
“running order” of the article in each volume and issue. They consist of binary variables 
for whether the article appeared first in a volume or first in an issue. Lastly, εit is an error 
term. 
 We estimate a similar equation in examining the alphabetical ordering of authors 
with collaborative articles. There, the sample is restricted to coauthored articles, and the 
dependent variable is the probability that coauthored paper has an ordering of names that 
deviates from the alphabetical ordering of last names. The same set of control variables is 
included in those equations. 
 
                                                 
31 We believe that the count of equations for articles with formal models is a noisy measure of a model’s 
sophistication. Articles are not consistent in their numbering conventions. Some articles number only a 
subset of the equations they include, and this tendency appears particularly pronounced for game theoretic 
articles. 
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III. Law Reviews 
A. Summary Data 
Table 1 reports summary statistics on the law reviews. It presents two cuts at the 
data: column (1) includes all the articles published, and column (2) includes only “major 
articles.” Excluded from the category of major articles are book reviews, student notes 
and comments, tributes and memorials, and symposium pieces. As column (1) shows, 
these other types of publications compose 73% of the items published in the law reviews. 
There are strong reasons to treat these other types of publications differently. First, 
authors of major articles tend to be faculty, while students usually write notes and 
comments. The purpose of notes and comments is arguably primarily pedagogical rather 
than scholarly.  Book reviews are arguably different as well. Although they can 
approximate a full article in length and scope, their purpose is to review an existing work 
rather than to make a stand-alone contribution. Tributes and memorials also serve a 
different purpose. They often lack scholarly content, and even when they do, it often is a 
summation of the honoree’s prior work rather than a novel, independent contribution. 
They sometimes contain personal reminiscences, and they tend to be brief. Articles 
appearing in symposia are a harder call, but here we treat them as separate from major 
articles. Symposium publications tend to result from invitations rather than the 
submission process governing regular issues, and they tend to be shorter than major 
articles. It is also doubtful whether a symposium contribution carries the same heft in a 
junior scholar’s tenure evaluation as a major article does. We tend to think it does not, 
and for that reason, we treat law review symposiums as different from major articles.  
 Table 1 shows that major articles differ from the other categories of publication 
across several dimensions. The incidence of coauthorship nearly doubles when the data 
are limited to major articles. This pattern is consistent with the fact that student notes and 
comments are nearly always single-authored. Table 1 shows that among major articles, 
nearly 20% were coauthored during the decade. This aggregate figure masks considerable 
temporal movements in coauthorship during the decade.32 Figure 1 shows the faction of 
major articles in law reviews that were coauthored by year. The time series do not show a 
monotonic increase, but an upward trend in coauthorship can be detected. In 2000, 15% 
of major articles were coauthored, and by 2010, this figure was 23%.  
Although not reported here, the growth in coauthorship has not been accompanied 
by an increase in the number of authors on each coauthored article. Of the coauthored 
articles 86% had two authors, nearly 11% had three authors, and about 3% had three or 
more authors. While there is some year-to-year fluctuation in the size of coauthorships, 
there is no pronounced upward trend favoring larger collaborations. In other words, the 
growth in coauthorships in these law reviews is due to expansion along the extensive 
                                                 
32 The rate represents an increase from the findings of George and Guthrie, supra n. 3, of a 15% rate for 
law reviews. 
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rather than intensive margin. This pattern contrasts sharply with the norms in the physical 
sciences, where it is common to list all members of a laboratory’s research team as 
authors.  
 Major articles and other categories of publication also diverge in the frequency 
with which they employ interdisciplinary methodologies.  Major law review articles boast 
rates of empirical, formal theory, or humanities approaches that are roughly double the 
rates for all items published in law reviews.. This is perhaps unsurprising because the 
different types of items published in law reviews tend to follow different conventions. A 
purpose of a student note or comment is to demonstrate command of law, and law 
students, whose immediate academic aim is to master the law, are less likely to possess 
the training necessary to produce interdisciplinary work. Book reviews and tributes tend 
to follow the essay form and survey and evaluate existing work rather than introduce 
novel analysis. Symposium pieces are also less likely to be interdisciplinary, perhaps 
because the restriction of topic or the fixed time-frames of symposiums restrict 
opportunities to employ other methodologies. 
Despite the concentration of interdisciplinary work in major articles,, the use of 
interdisciplinary methodologies remains scarce in the law reviews. These measures of 
interdisciplinarity suggest that articles using formal methodologies constitute only a small 
fraction of the scholarship in law reviews. At first blush, these estimates seem in tension 
with the widespread belief, which we share, that interdisciplinary scholarship has enjoyed 
substantial growth in recent decades.33 On closer inspection, the tension is not as great as 
it first appears. Figure 1 shows a slight upward trend in the incidence of empirical articles 
in law reviews. There is some variability over the decade, but the rate of empirical 
articles rises from slightly more than 5% in 2000 to about 10% in 2010. Still, the low 
incidence of empiricism even at the end of the decade may surprise critics who believe 
that legal empirical studies is overdone.34 An important caveat is our classification 
scheme does not encompass nontechnical interdisciplinary work. As described above, we 
suspect our coding of humanities-oriented scholarship undercounts some, perhaps much, 
of that scholarship. In addition, our coding scheme simply does not incorporate 
nontechnical law & economics. For example, an article applying economic analysis 
without a formal, mathematical model is not counted in our measures of interdisciplinary 
methodologies. Our measures are confined to instances in which technical methods of 
formal modeling or empiricism. According to these metrics, law review articles 
infrequently apply more technical interdisciplinary methods.  
                                                 
33 See Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Law’s Criteria: Law’s Relation to Private Ordering, 2 Berkeley 
Bus. L.J. 95, 97 (2005) (“The most dramatic change in law teaching over the last generation has been the 
growth of interdisciplinary scholarship”); George L. Priest, The Growth of Interdisciplinary Research and 
the Industrial Structure of the Production of Legal Ideas: A Reply to Judge Edwards, 91 MICH. L. REV. 
1929 (1993) 
34 Brian Leiter, On So-called “Empirical Legal Studies” and its Problems, blog post, available at 
http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2010/07/on-socalled-empirical-legal-studies.html 
16 
Table 1 shows other differences in the types of law review publications. Major 
articles tend to be longer than student notes, book reviews, and tributes. Page lengths are 
expressed in natural logarithms in order to place less weight on a few extremely long 
articles. In log terms, major articles are slightly longer. In actual pages, the average major 
article is 60 pages, and the average length of the other categories of publication is only 41 
pages. This difference is consistent with the common observation that tributes, book 
reviews, and student pieces tend to be shorter than major articles. Although not shown in 
the table, coauthorship implies no difference in the average page length of major articles, 
but the median length of coauthored articles is two pages shorter.  
Another difference between major articles and other pieces is that major articles 
are much more likely to appear first in the “running order” of printed issues. When a law 
review dedicates an entire issue to a symposium, a symposium piece necessarily occupies 
the lead position. Tributes and memorials often appear at the beginning of law reviews 
issues. The data show that consistent with conventional understanding, student notes and 
book reviews virtually never lead off an issue. In these data, student notes never appear 
first in the issues.  
Major articles are also far more likely to be cited. Column (2) of Table 1 shows 
that the typical major article is on average nearly two times per year. In contrast, other 
forms of law review publication receive only fractional citations per year. The typical 
tribute is cited on average .04 times per year, the typical student note is cited .20 times 
per year, and the typical book review .46 times per year. Even articles in appearing in 
symposiums are cited only once per year on average, nearly half of the citations of the 
“regular” or typical major law review article.  
In addition to these differences, there are several dimensions across which major 
articles and the other categories of publication are similar. Given the manner in which the 
data were assembled, it is unsurprising that the average age of articles is the same across 
the two samples. Perhaps most interestingly, Table 1 shows that their distribution across 
legal subjects is almost identical. An important caveat is that our topical coding was 
relatively crude. More than half the articles ended up in the “public law” category. 
Nevertheless, the inclusion of student notes, book reviews, symposiums, and tributes 
does not alter the distribution of law review publications by topic. Other than public law 
– which we suspect is something of a catch-all category – private and commercial law 
was the most popular topic, accounting for roughly 20% of the items published. Criminal 
law represented another 10%. Despite their popularity during the past decade, corporate 
and international law account for little more than 10% of the published items. 
We also observed substantial variation across law reviews in the rates at which 
they publish coauthored and empirical work. Figure 2 shows that the fraction of major 
articles that were coauthored and empirical by law review. Chicago led the way on both 
fronts. The share of its major articles that were coauthored (33%) was more than twice 
that of NYU (13%). In fact, Chicago exceeded by nearly ten percentage points the next 
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top venue for coauthorships (Penn). With regard to empiricism, the differences were also 
substantial. The widest gap was between Chicago, in which 17% of major articles were 
empirical, and Georgetown, in which around 2% of articles were empirical.  
 An initial inspection of the law review data provides some support for the 
prediction of a correlation between collaboration and interdisciplinarity. Figure 3 shows 
the relationship between coauthorship and the use of interdisciplinary methodologies. 
Panel A repeats in visual form the information about major articles in column (2) of 
Table 1, and Panel B shows the distribution of methodology in major articles that are 
coauthored. The pie charts reveal that the median coauthored article employs no special 
methodology, but it is much more likely to be empirical than a solo-authored article. The 
rate of empiricism among coauthored articles is 21.6% in contrast to 9.4% among all 
major articles. The fraction of formal models also rises slightly, to 5.2% from 3.5%. It 
suggests that articles presenting formal models are more likely to be coauthored than the 
traditional law review article, but less likely to be coauthored than an empirical article. In 
contrast, the presence of humanities methodologies is lower among coauthored articles 
(2.6% versus 5.2% in the full sample). This pattern is consistent with the low rate of 
coauthorship in the humanities as mentioned in the introduction.35  
   
B. Determinants of Coauthorship 
The summary statistics show an upward trend in coauthorship, and to a lesser degree 
empiricism, in major law reviews. They also reveal that empirical articles are far more 
likely to be coauthored. To assess whether these relationships persist after controlling for 
other influences, we turn to regression analysis. As described above, we estimate a series 
of probit models in which the dependent variable is the whether the article is coauthored 
or not.  The independent variables include the methodological approach, the log of the 
length of the article, average number of cites per year since publication, and several 
measures of the qualities of the article including the subject, article type, and placement 
in the journal. The results are laid out in Table 2. The table reports marginal effects, 
rather than coefficients, in order to ease interpretation of the estimates. The first two 
columns analyze the complete sample of all articles published; the last two columns 
analyze major articles only. To account for the observed time trend we described in Part 
III.A, we estimate two models for each sample: one including a time trend, and the other 
including fixed effects for the number of years since publication. All equations also 
include fixed effects for each law review.36 
The results are largely consistent with our predictions and the patterns seen in the 
summary statistics. The estimates show a strong correlation between coauthorship and the 
presence of empirical analysis in an article. In the full sample, when an article is 
                                                 
35 infra.  
36 Although not reported in the tables, the coefficients for the law reviews are jointly significant with p-
values less than .05 in all equations in Tables 2 and 4. 
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empirical, the likelihood it is coauthored is higher by 16 percentage points, and for major 
law review articles, the likelihood is 26 percentage points higher. The estimates for other 
forms of interdisciplinary work are weaker. In the full sample, articles with formal 
models have a higher probability of coauthorship by three percentage points, and for 
humanities-oriented articles, the probability is lower by about two percentage points. 
When the sample is limited to major articles, these differences become slightly larger in 
magnitude, but they remain much smaller than the effect of empiricism. At most, the 
presence of a formal model implies a difference in the likelihood of coauthorship of 
seven percentage points, and humanities implies a difference of less than five percentage 
points. Because the estimates are less precise in the smaller sample, they lose statistical 
significance. The results are consistent with the idea that empirical analysis of law 
provides strong opportunities for collaboration, stronger than other forms of 
interdisciplinary work such as formal model or humanities. 
 The probit regressions in Table 2 also include several explanatory variables that 
might be considered rough proxies for an article’s quality: its placement in the running 
order of an issue and the number of citations it subsequently receives. It is difficult to 
obtain reliable measures of an article’s quality because quality determinations of much 
scholarship are subjective. Therefore, the measures we employ come largely from 
academic lore. It is sometimes said that prestige attaches to an article’s appearing first in 
a volume, and if so, law review editors may assign the article they believe to have the 
highest quality to that spot. The estimates in Table 2 imply that articles leading off a 
volume are about four percentage points more likely to be coauthored, but the effect is 
statistically insignificant when the sample is limited to major articles. Articles that appear 
first in other issues of a volume are no more or less likely to be coauthored.  
A second measure of quality is the number of citations an article subsequently 
receives. This measure is inadequate for many reasons. A citation may be given in order 
to criticize rather than praise an article. A superfluous citation may be given to a friend, 
or a deserving citation may be denied to an adversary. One may give citations to one’s 
own prior work to boost its prominence. Despite these and other distortionary practices, a 
literature analyzing citations and interpreting them as an article’s quality or influence has 
developed.37 We follow that literature in controlling for citations, and Table 2 shows that 
the average number of citations an article receives per year correlates positively with 
coauthorship. But, the estimated effect is small. Taking the largest estimate in Table 2, a 
doubling of the average number of annual citations for a major article from 1.9 to 3.8 
would imply only an 8.4 percentage point increase in the likelihood of coauthorship. On 
the whole, these measures suggest that empiricism has a stronger bearing on coauthorship 
than quality. 
                                                 
37 Theodore Eisenberg and Martin T. Wells, Ranking and Explaining the Scholarly Impact of Law 
Schools, 27 J. Leg. Studies 373 (1998); Ian Ayres and Frederick K. Vars, Determinants of Citations to 
Articles in Elite Law Reviews, 29 J. Leg. Stud. 427 (2000); Theodore Eisenberg and Martin T. Wells, 
Ranking and Explaining the Scholarly Impact of Law Schools, 27 J. Leg Studies 37 (1998). 
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The subject matter of coauthored work also correlates closely with the incidence of 
coauthorship. The omitted category is corporate and securities law, and the negative 
estimates on the indicator variables for other subjects imply that articles on these topics 
are less likely to be coauthored than corporate and securities articles. The magnitudes of 
these correlations are relatively modest. The largest – a decline of about 12 percentage 
points for the average public law article – is smaller than the effect of empiricism. When 
the sample is restricted to major articles, the estimate for private law loses statistical 
significance. We suspect that corporate and securities law is not uniquely complex or 
technical, compared with our other subject categories. Rather, empiricism correlates with 
subject areas. Only corporate law and private law articles were more likely to be 
coauthored than singly authored. Other subject categories were less likely to be 
coauthored. 
The positive estimate for the time trend in columns (1) and (3) suggests that the 
likelihood of articles in top law reviews being coauthored is rising, even after controlling 
for other characteristics of the article. The estimate from the sub-sample of major articles 
in column (3) implies that the probability a major article is coauthored rises by ten 
percentage points every five years, which is a sharper upward movement than was 
evident in Figure 1. Movements over time in likelihood of collaboration may be linear, 
and for that reason, the equations in columns (2) and (4) replace the time trend with the 
more flexible fixed effects for years of publication. The coefficients on the fixed effects 
for publication years were jointly significant (with p-values less than .05), and this 
replacement has virtually no effect on the other estimates for other variables.  
Table 3 reports the results from a test of the compensatory theory, or the idea that 
empirical articles are more likely to involve deviations from the norm that author names 
are alphabetically ordered. The table shows probit regressions on the probability that the 
sequence of authors names deviates from alphabetical ordering among coauthored 
articles. Most of the estimates from the full data set are close to zero and statistically 
insignificant. Two exceptions are large point estimates for tributes and student notes. 
Perhaps not much credence should be given to them because they are based on a very 
small number of observations; only 8 tributes and only 7 student notes in sample were 
coauthored.  
The restriction of the sample to major law review articles does not change most of the 
estimates. Although a few flip sign, they remain modest in size and statistically 
insignificant. The exception here is the estimate on empiricism. For major law review 
articles, empiricism is the only covariate that is statistically significant predictor of 
reversal of author order. Moreover, its estimated effect, 8 percentage points, is enormous 
relative to the baseline rate of non-alphabetic orderings for major, coauthored articles: 
16%. The estimate implies that the rate of deviating from an alphabetic ordering is 
roughly twice as high for empirical coauthored articles as for other types of 
coauthorships. Interestingly, this pattern does not appear attributable to the importation of 
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different crediting practices from other disciplines. Ph.D. economists are responsible for 
much of the recent empirical legal studies, and alphabetic ordering has long been the 
norm in economics. Moreover, the estimates for formal theory and humanities do not 
predict sizable or statistically significant differences in name sequencing. The 
relationship between empiricism and deviations from alphabetical name order does not 
appear to reflect the migration of different credit conventions from other disciplines. 
While further investigation is necessary, the results for non-alphabetic ordering are 
consistent with a high demand for empirical skill commanding a high compensation, 
though there may be other explanations for the pattern. 
 
IV. Peer Reviewed Legal Journals 
A. Summary Data 
In this section we compare the qualities of articles published in the JLS and JLEO 
with major articles published in law reviews. The analysis includes all articles published 
in the JLS and JLEO. Unlike law reviews, these faculty edited journal do not publish 
student notes, book reviews, or tributes as law reviews, but they occasionally publish 
symposiums. To make our results as comparable as possible to the results for law 
reviews, we present estimates for these journals, both including and excluding 
symposiums. Symposium pieces compose about 20% of the articles published in these 
journals over these years. As the results demonstrate, the inclusion of symposium articles 
has little effect on the observed patterns. 
Table 4 presents summary statistics for this sample. There are several contrasts with 
the law review sample that are immediately apparent: these journals feature more 
collaborative work, more interdisciplinary work and more technical sophistication. 
Coauthored articles comprise nearly half of the articles published in these journals during 
these two decades. This is more than double the rate of coauthorship for major articles in 
the top law reviews during the past decade.  
With respect to technical methodologies, empirical articles account for roughly 30% 
of the articles in these journals over this period, which is about three times the rate in law 
reviews during the past decade. More strikingly, articles involving formal models account 
for 40% or more of the articles in the faculty-edited journals, which is an order of 
magnitude higher than in the law reviews. Perhaps unsurprisingly for two journals 
focused on law and economics, humanities-oriented articles were too rare to record as a 
separate category. Instead, we noted when an article contained both a formal model and 
empirical analysis. These articles, which are in a sense doubly interdisciplinary, represent 
less than 10% of the published pieces in these journals.  
Figure 4 shows the fluctuations over time in the mix of theory and empirics in the 
peer reviewed journals. In most years, theory was more common than empirics, but both 
are well represented. The amount of empirics in the journals has varied from year to year. 
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For all of the attention that “empirical legal studies” has received, the figure does not 
show a dramatic surge in the presence of empirical work in these journals. Rather, 
empirical analyses have been a mainstay of these journals. Articles containing both a 
formal model and empirical analysis were only a small share of the publications 
throughout this period. 
Figure 5 examines the relationship between technicality and coauthorship over time. 
It shows the movements in “nontechnical” articles, which we define as articles that 
contain neither empirical work nor a formal model. Over this period, these journals 
shifted sharply away from nontechnical articles: the share declined from 40% of articles 
at the end of the 1980’s to less than 10% by 2005.38 In the last five years, nontechnical 
articles have remained below 10% of these journals’ published output. We believe this 
dramatic decline reflects the “maturation” of law & economics. Early applications of 
economics to law could make substantial progress by employing economic ideas at a 
broad, conceptual level without technical nuance. As early contributions were scrutinized 
or challenged, it became necessary to specify the precise conditions under which 
particular results would obtain, and more formal modeling was necessary. Similarly, 
economic analysis of law generated a welter of predictions about the consequences of 
laws, and statistical testing of these predictions is necessarily technical. Another factor is 
that, during the past twenty years, economics itself became more technical in its models 
and empirics, and these methods migrated into law & economics. Computing costs have 
declined sharply over his period, and large datasets are readily available on the internet. 
This means that enormous amounts of data can now be handled at low cost. Off-the-shelf 
statistical software permits application of sophisticated statistical procedures with ease. 
All of these factors have spurred more elaborate empirical analyses.  
Nontechnical law & economics has not, of course, disappeared from legal academia. 
For example, it remains a substantial portion of the program at the annual American Law 
& Economics Association conference. Rather, we suspect that much of that work has 
migrated to law reviews.39  
As nontechnical work has vanished from these journals, technical analyses and 
coauthorship have become more closely correlated. Figure 5 shows that for these 
journals, as nontechnical articles have become increasingly, general trends in 
coauthorship are determined almost exclusively by trends in coauthorship in their 
technical articles. Figure 6 steps back from the time series patterns and examines the 
relationship between coauthorship and specific methodologies. Panel A repeats in visual 
form the figures in column (2) of Table 4: the fraction of all major articles by 
                                                 
38 Figure 5 does not separately break out the trends for each journal. Yet, the data available on JLS 
extends back to the 1970s, and in those data, it is apparent that the fall in nontechnical articles in that 
journal is even more pronounced over the longer time period. In the 1980’s, more than half of the journal’s 
articles were nontechnical under our definition, and that share falls with a few brief interruptions until the 
end of our observation period in 2010. 
39 We did not code the law reviews for nontechnical law & economics, because it would be very difficult 
to identify such work from a brief inspection of the article. 
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methodology. Panel B of Figure 6 shows the same fractions for coauthored articles. The 
contrast as not as pronounced as in Figure 3 for law reviews, but some differences are 
noticeable. Empiricism accounts for a slightly larger share of coauthored articles than all 
articles (36% versus 31%) as do articles employing both formal models and empirics 
(6.5% versus 10%). In contrast, nontechnical articles are much less likely to be 
coauthored. They account for 14% of all articles but only 6% of coauthored articles.  
These features of the data made clear that growing technical sophistication was a 
central trend in these journals. Therefore, we collected several proxies for the technical 
complexity of articles. Table 4 shows that 37% of all articles in these two journals had at 
least one appendix, and they had on average 1.6 figure. Even nontechnical articles 
sometimes had figures, such as supply and demand diagrams.40 The average length of 
articles was 25 pages, which is considerably shorter than the 55 pages of the typical law 
review article. In addition, symposium pieces in these journals averaged about 5 pages 
shorter than the typical article. Average article length rose slowly but steadily over this 
period. For example, in the first five years of the 1990’s, the average length was 23.3 
pages, and in the last five years of the 2000’s, it was 28.7 pages. The growing length of 
articles may be another reflection of the rising degree of technicality, or it may simply 
indicate the maturation of law & economics. That is, more recent articles have a larger 
body of existing work to confront and discuss as a prelude to making their own 
contributions. While far from certain, the slightly lower rate at which articles in these 
journals are cited (1.3 per year versus 1.9 per year) may indicate that more technical work 
is less accessible to a wide audience than is the typical law review article.  
The distribution of articles across topics in the faculty-edited journals differed slightly 
from law reviews. The coding of subjects was not fully comparable, because we observed 
that the faculty-edited journals included some articles that did not pertain to any specific 
area of law. Rather, they were effectively economics articles. We coded these articles as 
“Other,” and they represented about 10% of the articles in these journals. Private law 
subjects were more prevalent in the peer-reviewed journals than the law reviews, and the 
percentage of public law topics is roughly half that in law reviews. These differences are 
consistent with the close attention economic analysis of law has given to common law 
subjects such as contracts.  
               
  
                                                 
40 Although not reported here in order to conserve space, we collected other metrics of technical 
complexity. For example, we found that empirical papers averaged 5.7 tables, and formal papers averaged 
16 equations. Our confidence in the estimate of tables is greater than for equations. Counting numbered 
equations was difficult, because there was some inconsistency across articles in whether every equation 
was numbered. This was especially true for game-theoretic articles, which while clearly technical, often did 
not number their equations. 
23 
B. Determinants of Coauthorship 
As with the analysis of law reviews, we also interrogate the determinants of 
coauthorship, and run a parallel set of probit regressions on coauthorship and deviations 
of alphabetical name ordering among coauthored pieces. The first two columns of each 
table report regression results on the full sample of all articles published in these journals, 
and the last two columns display results from a sample excluding symposium pieces. The 
removal of the symposium pieces from the sample has no material effect on the 
estimates. The estimates in columns (1) and (2) show that after controlling for other 
factors, a symposium piece is about as likely to be coauthored as a typical article. The 
point estimate for a symposium piece is slightly negative but not statistically significant.  
The estimates for methodology are not exactly comparable to those for the law 
reviews. For the law reviews, articles not employing any special interdisciplinary 
methodology were the omitted (or comparison) category. For faculty edited journals, the 
analogous category would be nontechnical articles. But the precipitous decline in 
nontechnical articles during this period meant that there were very few observations in 
this group during the last years of the sample. For that reason, articles with formal models 
and nontechnical articles constituted the omitted category in Tables 5 and 6.41 The results 
show that relative to these groups, articles with empirical work or with both formal 
modeling and empirics are more likely to be coauthored. The difference ranges from 14 
to 18 percentage points, which is slightly smaller than the impact of empiricism on major 
articles in law reviews. But it must be remembered that the comparison group here 
includes articles with formal models, and the overall average rate of coauthorship is much 
higher (49% versus 20%).  
In addition, these equations include two additional controls for technical complexity. 
Estimates for both of those measures are positive and statistical significant. They imply 
that a one-standard deviation increase in the number of figures in an article corresponds 
to a three percentage point increase in the probability the article is coauthored. More 
importantly, the presence of an appendix to an article suggests a ten percentage point 
increase in the likelihood of coauthorship. 
As with the law reviews, the proxies for article quality provide mixed results. Again, 
an article’s page length does not correlate with coauthorship. Average citations per year 
predict coauthorship, and the magnitude of the estimate is identical to that for law 
reviews. Oddly, the lead position in the second issue in a volume correlates strongly with 
coauthorship,42 but lead position in the first issue of the volume does not. Unlike the law 
                                                 
41 Although not reported here due to space constraints, we also estimated the equations using only 
nontechnical articles as the comparison group. The estimates for empirical articles and articles containing 
both formal theory and empirics were even longer than those shown in Tables 5 and 6. Also, articles with 
formal theory were more likely to be coauthored than nontechnical articles. These results imply that 
consistent with Figure 6, any article employing a technical methodology was more likely to be coauthored 
than a nontechnical article. 
42 These journals have only two regular issues per year. 
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reviews, the subject matter of the articles does not predict coauthorship. In contrast to the 
results for law reviews, the point estimates for subject matter are generally smaller, 
possessing different signs, and statistically insignificant. Lastly, Table 5 shows that as 
with law reviews, there is an upward trend in coauthorships, even after controlling for 
other factors. The size of the estimate is half as larger as in the law review sample. But 
the flatter slope is perhaps not surprising as the average rate of coauthorships for these 
journals was already much higher than among law reviews.  
Table 6 tests the compensation theory for the faculty edited journals. Again, the 
dependent variable is whether the coauthors deviate from an alphabetical sequencing of 
names. Only two variables appear to have any impact on this ordering. As with the law 
reviews, empirical articles were substantially more likely to depart from the alphabetical 
norm. The rate at which the average coauthored article did not follow alphabetical 
ordering was seven to eleven percentage points higher than in the comparison group. This 
difference represents a very substantial increase because on average only 12% of 
coauthored (non-symposium) articles did not have alphabetical ordering. Interestingly, 
the estimates for articles containing both theory and empirics are smaller (2 – 4 
percentage points) and not statistically significant.  
The other significant predictor in these regressions was whether the article was a 
symposium piece. The estimate reflects the fact that 25% of coauthored symposium 
pieces in the sample did not have alphabetical ordering. Why this is so is left for future 
investigation. 
 
V. Implications and Extensions 
Coauthorship, we have demonstrated, is indeed on the rise, as earlier analyses have 
suggested. In keeping with theories of complementarity, it appears that coauthorship is a 
response to increasingly technical demands in scholarship, as it is found most frequently 
in the peer-reviewed journals, then in major law review articles, and less frequently 
observed in lower-status work in law reviews including book reviews, student notes, and 
symposium pieces. We have also demonstrated that empirical and interdisciplinary work, 
with their increasingly sophisticated methodologies, are driving much of the coauthorship 
trend. 
We have not directly addressed the normative question about whether the trend 
toward coauthorshjp is a good thing or not. To the extent coauthorship is driven by the 
empirical turn in legal scholarship, it will be subject to many of the criticisms directed at 
that movement. Professor Leiter has recently questioned the trend, even challenging the 
use of the term “empirical legal studies.”43 If, as our analysis suggests, coauthored 
empirical work is more technically sophisticated (as demonstrated through more figures 
and appendices in peer reviewed journals), then there is certainly a risk that it will be 
                                                 
43 Leiter, supra n.34 
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more difficult for traditional legal academics to understand. This could provoke a 
backlash in the legal academy, even as the work becomes more accessible to those from 
other disciplines. 
At the same time, our finding about citation counts indicates the possibility that 
coauthored work is of higher quality overall. A full analysis of the consequences of 
coauthorship is beyond the scope of this paper. But a finding that coauthored work was of 
higher quality would be consistent with our analysis, and would help to rebut the 
complaint our beloved colleague. 
Another challenge associated with coauthorship is the assignment of credit among 
authors. This is a real issue for tenure committees, academic administrators, and other 
consumers of academic research. Since the precise division of effort in any article is not 
readily apparent, even to the coauthors, this is a very tough problem to solve. Indeed, one 
might imagine that the total amount of credit being assigned to coauthored work by 
external audiences is more than it should be.  
Our evidence on name-order reversal suggests that those doing empirical work, in 
particular, are better able to make the division clear. This may result from the importation 
of norms from other disciplines, or the fact that empirical authors are more likely to insist 
on full credit for their specialized skills. It may also be the case that the division of labor 
is clearer in empirical work than in other kinds of scholarship. One author typically takes 
the lead in any quantitative empirical analysis, and so the precise division among 
coauthors is clearer, even to the authors themselves. This allows an easier negotiation 
over name order.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
We have provided an economic theory of coauthorship that emphasizes the crucial 
role of complementarity, as well as compensation, credit diminution and other factors, in 
driving the decision to coauthor. Complementarity is affected by the labor market for 
academics, but also by technological advances that allow for increasingly sophisticated 
technical work. We thus observe the trend to coauthorship is greatest in disciplines like 
economics and hard science, and much slower in humanistic scholarship in which the 
tools of research have not been affected by technical developments. Within law, 
coauthorship is driven by empirical and inter-disciplinary work that is itself influenced by 
outside fields, and relies on the same tools that push coauthorship generally. Empirical 
scholars also seem better able to resolve some of the problems of credit assignment that 
have been identified as one of the risks of coauthorship. While we do not directly address 
the quality of coauthored work, our analysis is consistent with the theory that suggests 
that it is producing more sophisticated, and more influential scholarship, and if this is so 
we expect the trend to intensify in years to come.  
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Table 1. 
Summary Statistics on Articles in Top Fifteen Law Reviews, 2000–2010 
 
 
 
 
 
All Articles 
(1) 
Major Articles 
Only 
(2) 
Coauthored .121 
(.326) 
 
.201 
(.401) 
 
Empirical .053 
(.225) 
 
.094 
(.292) 
 
Formal Theory .021 
(.144) 
 
.035 
(.185) 
 
Humanities .033 
(.180) 
 
.053 
(.223) 
 
(Log) Page Length 3.453 
(.837) 
 
3.938 
(.624) 
 
First in Volume .021 
(.144) 
 
.043 
(.203) 
 
First in Issue .084 
(.278) 
 
.173 
(.378) 
 
Tribute .034 
(.182) 
 
--  
Symposium  .286 
(.452) 
 
--  
Book Review .090 
(.287) 
 
-- 
Student Note or Comment .290 
(.454) 
 
-- 
Corporate/Securities Law .051 
(.220) 
 
.060 
(.237)  
Criminal Law .102 
(.303) 
 
.093 
(.290)  
Int’l / Comparative Law .059 
(.236) 
 
.061 
(.239) 
 
Private / Commercial Law .195 
(.391) 
 
.230 
(.421)  
Public Law .592 
(.481) 
 
.556 
(.497)  
27 
Time Trend 5.692 
(3.085) 
 
5.846 
(3.104) 
Citations per Year 
 
1.061 
(1.1697) 
1.931 
(2.197) 
 
N 7,540 2,785 
 
Note: The columns report means and in parentheses standard deviations. “Major articles” excludes student 
notes and comments, book reviews, tributes and memorials, and symposium articles.  
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Table 2. 
Probit Regressions on Number of Multiple-Authored Articles in Top Fifteen Law 
Reviews 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Empirical .163** 
(.022) 
 
.164** 
(.022) 
 
.255** 
(.033) 
.256** 
(.033) 
Formal Theory .030* 
(.019) 
 
.029* 
(.018) 
 
.067 
(.047) 
 
.066 
(.047) 
 
Humanities -.024** 
(.010) 
 
-.023** 
(.010) 
 
-.046 
(.034) 
 
-.044 
(.034) 
 
(Log) Page Length .009** 
(.004) 
 
.009** 
(.004) 
 
-.016 
(.013) 
 
-.016 
(.013) 
 
Average Citations 
per Year 
.011** 
(.002) 
 
.011** 
(.002) 
 
.021** 
(.004) 
.022** 
(.004) 
First in Volume .035** 
(.019) 
 
.035** 
(.019) 
 
.039 
(.039) 
 
.041 
(.039) 
 
First in Issue .001 
(.008) 
 
.001 
(.008) 
 
-.003 
(.021) 
 
-.005 
(.021) 
 
Tribute -.043** 
(.008) 
 
-.043** 
(.008) 
 
-- -- 
Symposium .007 
(.006) 
 
.007 
(.006) 
 
-- -- 
Book Review -.018** 
(.007) 
 
-.018** 
(.007) 
 
-- -- 
Student Note or 
Comment 
-.132** 
(.006) 
 
-.132** 
(.006) 
 
-- -- 
Criminal Law -.036** 
(.008) 
 
-.036** 
(.008) 
 
-.107** 
(.025) 
 
-.104** 
(.026) 
 
Int’l / Comparative 
Law 
-.040** 
(.007) 
 
-.039** 
(.007) 
 
-.099*** 
(.028) 
 
-.096*** 
(.029) 
 
Private / 
Commercial Law 
-.024** 
(.008) 
 
-.022** 
(.009) 
 
-.043 
(.030) 
 
-.042 
(.030) 
 
Public Law -.045** 
(.011) 
 
-.043** 
(.011) 
 
-.119** 
(.032) 
 
-.118** 
(.032) 
 
 Time Trend .005** 
(.001) 
-- .021** 
(.004) 
 
-- 
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Publication Year 
Fixed Effects? 
 Yes  Yes 
Major Articles 
Only? 
 
  Yes Yes 
N 7,540 7,540 2,785 2,785 
 
Note: The columns report marginal effects and standard errors in parentheses. Regressions also include 
fixed effects for law reviews. The omitted category of topic is Corporate & Securities Law.  Standard errors 
are clustered on articles. The symbol * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, and ** denotes 
statistical significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 3. 
Probit Regressions on Nonalphabetical Ordering of Coauthors  
in Articles in Top Fifteen Law Reviews 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Empirical .028 
(.035) 
 
.028 
(.035) 
 
.082** 
(.043) 
 
.081** 
(.043) 
 
Formal Theory -.065 
(.055) 
 
-.062 
(.055) 
 
-.007 
(.073) 
 
-.008 
(.073) 
 
Humanities -.067 
(.074) 
 
-.089 
(.065) 
 
.045 
(.109) 
 
.028 
(.103) 
 
(Log) Page Length .002 
(.020) 
 
-.005 
(.020) 
 
.018 
(.028) 
 
.014 
(.027) 
 
Average Citations 
per Year 
 
-.007 
(.007) 
-.007 
(.007) 
-.003 
(.007) 
-.042 
(.054) 
First in Volume .063 
(.079) 
 
.051 
(.079) 
 
-.040 
(.056) 
-.042 
(.054) 
First in Issue -.052 
(.031) 
 
-.050 
(.037) 
 
-.020 
(.039) 
 
-.023 
(.038) 
Tribute .318* 
(.206) 
 
.259 
(.215) 
 
-- -- 
Symposium .046 
(.032) 
 
.040 
(.032) 
 
-- -- 
Book Review -.024 
(.056) 
 
-.023 
(.055) 
 
-- -- 
Student Note or 
Comment 
.148 
(.206) 
 
.087 
(.196) 
 
-- -- 
Time Trend  -.008* 
(.005) 
-- -.006 
(.005) 
 
-- 
 
Publication Year 
Fixed Effects? 
 
 Yes  Yes 
Major Articles 
Only? 
 
  Yes Yes 
N 913 913 560 560 
 
 
Note: The columns report marginal effects and standard errors in parentheses. Regressions also include 
fixed effects for law reviews and for subject matter of the articles.  Standard errors are clustered on articles. 
The symbol * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, and ** denotes statistical significance at the 
5% level. 
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Table 4. 
Summary Statistics on Articles in JLS and JLEO, 1989–2010 
 
 
 
 
All Articles 
(1) 
Major Articles 
Only 
(2) 
Coauthored .464 
(.499) 
 
.496 
(.500) 
 
Empirical .286 
(.452) 
 
.313 
(.464) 
 
Formal Theory .398 
(.490) 
 
.466 
(.499) 
 
Both Formal Theory and 
Empirics 
.074 
(.261) 
 
.085 
(.278) 
 
(Log) Page Length 3.153 
(.500) 
 
3.216 
(.396) 
 
Average Citations per Year 
 
 
1.381 
(2.447) 
1.301 
(1.737) 
First in Volume .047 
(.213) 
 
.051 
(.212) 
 
First in Issue .052 
(.223) 
 
.051 
(.212) 
 
Symposium .199 
(.400) 
 
-- 
 
Number of Figures  1.608 
(2.618) 
 
1.662  
 (2.420) 
Any Appendices .372 
(.484) 
 
.428 
(.495)  
Corporate/Securities Law .080 
(.272) 
 
.097 
(.296)  
Criminal Law .053 
(.225) 
 
.065 
(.247) 
 
Int’l / Comparative Law .043 
(.202) 
 
.030 
(.171)  
Private / Commercial Law .320 
(.467) 
 
.345 
(.171)  
Public Law .299 
(.458) 
 
.300 
(.458) 
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Other Topic .205 
(.404) 
 
.163 
(.370) 
Time Trend 11.064 
(6.161) 
 
11.321 
(6.262) 
N 1,030 827 
 
Note: The columns report means and in parentheses standard deviations. “Major articles” excludes 
symposium articles.  
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Table 5. 
Probit Regressions on Number of Multiple Authored Articles in JLS and JLEO 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Empirical .135** 
(.038) 
 
.142** 
(.039) 
 
.152** 
(.040) 
 
.161** 
(.041) 
 
Both Formal 
Theory and 
Empirics 
.145** 
(.065) 
 
.153** 
(.063) 
 
.165** 
(.063) 
 
.179** 
(.063) 
 
(Log) Page Length .030 
(.038) 
 
.025 
(.039) 
 
.007 
(.050) 
 
-.0002 
(.051) 
 
Average Citations 
per Year 
 
.021** 
(.009) 
.021** 
(.009) 
.020** 
(.012) 
.020** 
(.012) 
Number of Figures 
 
.023** 
(.007) 
 
.024** 
(.007) 
 
.013** 
(.006) 
 
.014** 
(.008) 
 
Any Appendices? 
 
.113** 
(.036) 
 
.108** 
(.037) 
 
.098** 
(.038) 
 
.093** 
(.039) 
 
First in Volume .044 
(.074) 
 
.041 
(.073) 
 
-.009 
(.079) 
 
-.007 
(.080) 
 
First in Issue .167** 
(.072) 
 
.175** 
(.071) 
 
.145** 
(.078) 
 
.156** 
(.077) 
 
Symposium -.061 
(.045) 
 
-.064 
(.049) 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Criminal Law .046 
(.095) 
 
.050 
(.096) 
 
.073 
(.094) 
 
.080 
(.095) 
 
Int’l / Comparative 
Law 
-.029 
(.098) 
 
-.029 
(.103) 
 
-.118 
(.114) 
 
-.116 
(.120) 
 
Private / 
Commercial Law 
-.044 
(.070) 
 
-.047 
(.072) 
 
-.005 
(.074) 
 
-.019 
(.076) 
 
Public Law .003 
(.067) 
 
.008 
(.067) 
 
.032 
(.067) 
 
.034 
(.068) 
 
Other Topic -.018 
(.067) 
-.015 
(.067) 
.005 
(.068) 
.004 
(.067) 
     
Time Trend  .012** 
(.003) 
-- .010** 
(.003) 
 
-- 
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Publication Year 
Fixed Effects? 
 
 Yes  Yes 
Major Articles 
Only? 
 
  Yes Yes 
N 1,030 1,030 827 827 
 
Note: The columns report marginal effects and standard errors in parentheses. Regressions also include 
fixed effects for law reviews. The omitted category of topic is Corporate & Securities Law.  Standard errors 
are clustered on articles. The symbol * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, and ** denotes 
statistical significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 6. 
Probit Regressions on Nonalphabetical Ordering of Coauthors  
in Articles in JLS and JLEO 
 
  
 (1) 
 
 (2) 
  
(3) 
 
 (4) 
Empirical .070** 
(.035) 
 
.095** 
(.041) 
 
.069** 
(.035) 
 
.107** 
(.043) 
 
Both Formal 
Theory and 
Empirics 
.018 
(.054) 
 
.046 
(.068) 
 
.023 
(.056) 
 
.041 
(.067) 
 
(Log) Page Length .002 
(.039) 
 
.009 
(.044) 
 
.003 
(.048) 
 
.009 
(.054) 
 
Average Citations 
per Year 
-.004 
(.004) 
-.004 
(.004) 
.004 
(.010) 
.007 
(.010) 
     
Number of Figures 
 
 
-.001 
(.004) 
-.003 
(.005) 
.001 
(.005) 
.004 
(.007) 
Any Appendices? 
 
 
.020 
(.029) 
.005 
(.003) 
.041 
(.031) 
.025 
(.035) 
First in Volume -.079 
(.031) 
-.093 
(.027) 
-- -- 
 
 
First in Issue -.020 
(.049) 
 
-.005 
(.060) 
 
-.069 
(.043) 
 
-.077 
(.045) 
 
Symposium .150** 
(.064) 
 
.127** 
(.066) 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Time Trend  -.007** 
(.002) 
-- .007** 
(.002) 
 
-- 
Publication Year 
Fixed Effects? 
 
 Yes  Yes 
Major Articles 
Only? 
 
  Yes Yes 
N 479 479 389 389 
 
Note: The columns report marginal effects and standard errors in parentheses. Regressions also include 
fixed effects for law reviews and for the subject matter of the articles. Standard errors are clustered on 
articles. The symbol * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, and ** denotes statistical 
significance at the 5% level. 
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Figure 1. 
Trends in Empiricism and Coauthorship at Major Law Reviews, 2000–10 
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Figure 2. 
Variation across Major Law Reviews in Coauthorship and Empiricism, 2000–10 
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Figure 3. 
Coauthorship and Methodology at Major Law Reviews, 2000-10 
 
 
A. Fraction of Major Articles  
 
 
 
 
 
B. Fraction of Major Coauthored Articles 
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Figure 4. 
Trends in Methodology at JLEO and JLS, 1989–2010 
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Figure 5.  
Trends in Methodology and Coauthorship at JLS and JLEO, 1989–2010 
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Figure 6. 
Coauthorship and Methodology at JLS and JLEO, 2000-10 
 
 
A. Fraction of Major Articles  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Fraction of Major Coauthored Articles 
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